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COMMENTS
THE NOISE CONTROL ACT: LEGISLATIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS OF
IMPLEMENTATION
By
DAVID MEDINE*
INTRODUcTION
Noise,I unwanted sound, is not a new problem. At the turn of
the century, Nobel laureate Robert Koch predicted an increasing
concern with noise when he said, "[tihe day will come when men
will have to fight noise as inexorably as cholera and plague."2 Yet
problems of noise have not received the attention and concern
water and air pollution have attracted. Unlike water and air pollu-
tion, noise does not accumulate over time but, rather, dissipates
* Member, District of Columbia Bar; J.D., University of Chicago Law School,
1978; B.A., Hampshire College, 1975. The author gratefully acknowledges the guid-
ance of David P. Currie, Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago
Law School.
1. The most commonly used measure of sound, and therefore of noise, is the
decibel (dB), which is based on sound intensity and pressure. Because the greatest
pressure the ear registers is five million times the threshold pressure, scientists have
adopted a logarithmic ratio between measured sound pressure and a standard refer-
ence pressure, which means an arithmetic increase in the dB level actually repre-
sents a geometric increase in sound pressure. A measure of zero decibels is the
threshold of human hearing. To understand how this measure operates, an increase
in 3-dB doubles pressure though it takes a 10-dB difference for intensity to double.
It is intensity which corresponds to human perception of the difference in sound
levels.
Defining the decibel does not yet produce a figure which corresponds to human
annoyance. Sound may occur at different frequencies, some of which are inaudible.
To include them in this measure would distort the real effect a particular sound
creates. Sound measurement may be corrected by use of the A-weighting scale
which emphasizes audible frequencies and cuts down on inaudible frequencies. A-
weighted measurements are noted as dBA. The following are examples of typical
noise levels: a library, 35-dBA; birds singing, 45-dBA; dishwasher, 60-dBA; vacuum
cleaner, 80-dBA; shouting in an ear, 100-dBA; turbofan aircraft and rock music,
120-dBA; threshold of pain, 140-dbA. See Note, The Noise Control Act of 1972-
Congress Acts to Fill the Gap in Environmental Legislation, 58 MINN. L. REV. 273,
275 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NCA Note].
2. S. REP. No. 92-1160, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972).
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quickly.Because its effects are so subtle, noise is not widely recog-
nized as a cause of psychological and physiological damage.3 Fur-
thermore, noise imposes both economic and social costs on Ameri-
can society. Annual noise pollution costs from increased absentee-
ism, accidents, and decreased efficiency are estimated at four bil-
lion dollars.' This cost does not even include the escalating number
of claims for hearing loss compensation.' Excessive noise also
causes a marked decline in property values, especially near air-
ports.' Finally, noise harms the quality of life in a way which is
difficult to measure.
Perhaps even more than other forms of pollution, noise is con-
sidered a necessary and integral part of industrialized civilization.
The clatter of machines and the pounding of jackhammers have
been symbols of progress and growth. As with other forms of pollu-
tion, however, it is possible to realize economic growth while reduc-
ing noise levels and improving the quality of the environment.
Despite the national economic and health implications, it has
been possible for noise' control to take place at the local or state
level. By 1972, however, it was clear that for effective controls, the
federal government had to provide leadership and coordination.
States had shown little willingness to devote attention and funds
to the problem.' States were also faced with the problem of obtain-
ing technical information which they could not get themselves and
which was not being provided by an existing federal agency. On
October 18, 1972, the Noise Control Act (NCA)5 was passed, di-
3. See sources cited in Yamada, Urban Noise: Abatement, Not Adaptation, 6
ENVT'L L. 61 n.1 (1975).
4. NCA Note, supra note 1, at 278 and 118 CoNG. REc. H6043 (1972) (remarks
of Rep. Mikva).
5.. 118 CONG. REc. S35387 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Tunney).
6. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 192, 376 P.2d 100, 106
(1962); Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 316-18, 391 P.2d 540, 545-51
(1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
7. See 118 CONG. REC. S35387 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Tunney).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1976). Throughout the text references to sections
of the Act will be to Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (1972). As the environmental
movement began to accelerate in the late 1960s, Congress reacted by passing an
aircraft noise abatement bill, 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970), and including in the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1858(a) (1970) (amended 1977), Title IV,
which established an Office of Noise Abatement and Control within EPA. The
Office was to conduct a comprehensive study on noise problems with the objective
of submitting to Congress and the President recommendations for needed action.
On January 26, 1972 a report was submitted. The only other piece of noise control
legislation before 1972 was the Federal Aid to Highway Act of 1970, 23 U.S.C. §
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rectly involving the federal government in the quest for a quieter
environment.
The purpose of this Comment is to evaluate the choices made
by Congress in drafting the Act and the administrative implemen-
tation of those choices. The NCA gives the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) authority to regulate the noise characteristics
of new products,' motor carriers" and railroads," leaving to the
states responsibility for overall noise levels. 2 Standards are to be
based on the health and welfare of those exposed to new products"
and the cost and technology factors of reducing the noise of motor
carriers and railroads." In determining whether Congress has pro-
vided workable standards for regulating products and whether
EPA has been successful in implementing those standards, this
Comment will examine one particular product - old and new
trucks - as a representative example. Congress' failure to provide
civil penalties as part of EPA's enforcement authority will also be
examined. Finally, this Comment will propose a revision of the
NCA.
I. THE NOISE CONTROL ACT
The stated goal of the NCA is "an environment for all Ameri-
cans free from noise that jeopardizes their health and welfare.""
The primary approach of the NCA is to regulate noise characteris-
tics of new products. The challenge of this approach is in choosing
statutory language which will provide sufficient guidance to the
EPA in setting standards for each regulated product. There is a
tension between the view that standards should be set which are
protective of public health and welfare, regardless of cost, and the
view that considerations of cost and technology should be limiting
factors in a regulatory program. Faced with this choice in drafting
the NCA, Congress included elements of both types of standards
in a combination which, not surprisingly, has left EPA somewhat
109(h)(1) (1976), which banned federal aid to highways that did not include plans
and specifications to meet certain highway noise levels compatible with different
land uses.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 4905 (1976).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 4917 (1976).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 4916 (1976).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 4905(e)(2) (1976).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 4904(a)(1) (1976).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4904(b)(2) (1976).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4901(b) (1976).
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confused.'" Noise emissions from new products are to be set at a
level "requisite to protect public health and welfare, taking into
account the magnitude and conditions of use of such product
(alone or in combination with other noise sources), the degree of
noise reduction achievable through the application of the best
available technology, and the cost of compliance."' 7 The appropri-
ateness of this statutory standard must be judged by EPA's ability
to translate this language into actions consistent with the purpose
of the Act.
A. The Regulatory Scheme
Superficially, the NCA resembles the air quality standards
provisions in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.'1 The NCA
requires that EPA first publish a criteria document which is to be
a collection of scientific knowledge, not a set of standards, which
will be available for use by EPA as well as states and municipali-
ties in setting their own noise standards." Following this, EPA
must publish an environmental noise levels document which es-
tablishes xioise levels that are protective of health and welfare,
including an adequate margin of safety.31 These levels are compa-
rable to a combination of the primary and secondary ambient air
quality standards under the Clean Air Act 2' since they are based
neither on cost nor technological concerns.
Under the Clean Air Act the states must then design and
submit for EPA approval a plan for implementing, maintaining
and enforcing ambient air quality standards." Thus while the fed-
eral government insures that certain levels of pollutants protective
of public health and welfare are reached, states are given the free-
dom to draft a plan which takes into account particularly local
concerns. 3 However, the legislative history of the NCA indicates
16. Congress has occasionally not delegated the power to set standards to EPA
for particular products but instead set standards on its own. E.g., Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e) (1976) (eliminating the use of polychlorinated
biphenyls); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521(b)(1) (West Supp. 1977) (automobile
emission standards).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 4905(c)(1) (1976).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1970) (amended 1977).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 4904(a)(1) (1976).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 4904(a)(2) (1976).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1970) (amended 1977).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(1) (1970) (amended 1977).
23. Of course, if the state does not submit a plan which EPA believes will
[Vol. 9:311
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that, "States and local governments have the primary responsibil-
ity. . . . for setting and enforcing limits on environmental noise
which in their view are necessary to protect public health and
welfare.""4 It is somewhat ironic that passage of the NCA was
inspired by the failure of the states to adequately regulate noise
levels, yet the Act leaves to the states the primary responsibility
for establishing noise levels in the future.
Under the NCA, the Administrator of EPA is required to set
standards for major sources of noise in the categories of construc-
tion and transportation equipment, any motor or engine and
electrical or electronic equipment, 5 if they are "feasible. ' 26 New
products not in these categories may be regulated if standards are
"feasible and requisite to protect the public health and welfare. 12 7
If "feasibility" means technological feasibility, then the absence of
technology would seem to prevent EPA action regardless of the
threat posed to public health and welfare.
Ideally, the primary beneficial effect of the NCA is the regula-
tion of noise characteristics of new products.2 8 If new products are
made quieter, aside from overall noise reductions, states will be
greatly assisted in only having to regulate the use of quieter prod-
ucts in order to achieve desired ambient noise levels." Two prob-
achieve primary and secondary ambient air quality standards, the Administrator
must propose his own plan. Id. § 7409(c)(1)(C).
24. 118 CONG. REC. S35387 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Tunney).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 4905(a)(1) (1976). Products identified include buses, truck
transport refrigeration units, truck mounted solid waste compactors, motorcycles,
and wheel and crawler tractors, 40 Fed. Reg. 23107 (May 28, 1975); portable air
compressors, 41 Fed. Reg. 2162 (Jan. 14, 1976); lawnmowers, 42 Fed. Reg. 2526
(Jan. 12, 1977); paving breakers and rock drills, 42 Fed. Reg. 6722 (Feb. 3, 1977).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 4905(a)(1)(B) (1976).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 4905(b) (1976).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 4905 (1976).
29. The question of whether federal regulations should pre-empt state and
local efforts was one of the most controversial issues in passage of the Act. See
Cerar, Federal Preemption of Railroad Noise Control: A Case Study and Comment,
3 COLUM. J. ENV'r'L L., 1 (1976). States and environmentalists wanted the states to
have the option of adopting more stringent noise levels. In reaction to this possibil-
ity, Representative Staggers in House debate on the Act commented: "We have
evidence that across America some cities and states are trying to pass noise regula-
tions. Certainly we do not want that to happen. It would harass industry and
progress in America. That is the reason why I want to get this bill Ipassed during
this session." 118 CONG. REC. H37083 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Staggers). Under the
NCA, performance levels for products are pre-empted by federal regulations but
states and municipalities are free to impose nonconflicting restrictions including
19791
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lems are raised by this approach, however. The first problem is
determining how product standards can be translated into sound
levels which are protective of health and welfare. The difficulty
stems from the fact that products may be used in combination
with each other at varying distances from a listener. For example,
an air compressor can be built which is harmless if used by itself
at 100 yards, but when used with three others at five feet could
have a potential of causing hearing loss to people exposed. Thus,
without being able to regulate the use of a product it may be
impossible to determine proper levels of control. The second prob-
lem is created by focusing on new products. Leaving unregulated
products in use means there will only be a gradual reduction in
noise, in some cases taking years, as old products are replaced. An
increased number of products in use may even offset this reduc-
tion.30
Aside from regulating new products, the NCA isolates three
sources of noise pollution produced by equipment currently in use
for separate and different treatment. Airplanes are covered under
section 7 with primary responsibility assigned to the Federal Avia-
speed limits, bans on vehicles from certain streets and other similar restrictions.
42 U.S.C. § 4905(e) (1976). Theoretically federal pre-emption frees manufacturers
from the necessity of meeting a variety of different standards and allows them to
focus their efforts on attaining a national standard. However, based on the history
of federal preemption, especially for national automobile emissions standards, ef-
forts were directed at undermining rather than complying with standards. Senator
Muskie noted that "substitution of Federal Law for state law without assurance
that public health will be protected is poor public policy." S. REP. No. 92-1160, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., Minority Views, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4655, 4671.
30. Consistent with the approach of essentially regulating manufacturers, the
NCA imposes additional duties besides producing products which comply with
noise emission standards. Regulated products must be warranted to the ultimate
and subsequent purchasers that at the time of sale it was designed, built and
equipped to comply with the regulation. 42 US.C. § 4905(d) (1976). EPA may
specify a useful life over which the product must be warranted. This is to be strictly
a manufacturer's warranty; thus, if a dealer incurs any costs in fulfilling the war-
ranty, the costs may be recovered from the manufacturer.
In conjunction with new product regulations, Section 8 of the NCA 42 U.S.C.
§ 4907 (1976), requires the Administrator to designate products which are capable
of either producing injurious noise or effectively reducing noise. Regulations must
then be issued requiring manufacturers to include a label with such products con-
taining either their noise emission levels or their noise reduction effectiveness. See
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking - Noise Labeling Standards - General Provisions,
42 Fed. Reg. 31722 (June 22, 1977); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking - Noise Label-
ing Requirement - Hearing Protectors, 42 Fed. Reg. 31730 (June 22, 1977).
[Vol. 9:311
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tion Administration (FAA)."' Railroads and motor carriers are each
covered by special sections requiring EPA to issue regulations
within a specified period of time." Since transportation is gener-
ally considered the principal source of noise in American urban
areas,13 it is a reasonable inference that Congress, in providing
EPA with special regulatory authority in this area, was clearly
dissatisfied with the status quo. Hence, regulations under these
sections may be judged by the degree to which, in the short term,
they improve the situation which existed at the time of the Act's
passage.
Several methods for the enforcement of product regulations
are provided in section 11 of the Act.3' A substantial criminal pen-
alty of up to $25,000 per day of violation and a jail term of up to
one year may be imposed on violators.- In addition, two less oner-
ous alternatives are provided: an injunction may be sought in dis-
triot court to restrain any violations, or the Administrator of EPA,
after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, may issue orders
specifying appropriate relief.36 However, no civil penalties are pro-
vided. 3
Rather than centralize all noise control functions of the federal
government in EPA, Congress saw EPA as a coordinator, consci-
ence and jawboner.3 Decentralization was most likely retained
because noise is not a distinct concern but one enmeshed in unre-
lated matters handled by government agencies or departments
with special expertise in different fields, such as housing (Housing
and Urban Development), highways (Department of Transporta-
tion), airplanes (Federal Aviation Administration) and employee
health and safety (Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4906 (1976).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4916(a), 4917(e) (1976).
33. Hearings on S. 1016 and S. 1566 Before the Subcomm. on the Environment
of the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings], and EPA Noise Emission Standards for Motor Carriers Engaged in
Interstate Commerce, 39 Fed. Reg. 38208 (1974) (introductory notice by John
Quarles, Acting Administrator) [hereinafter cited as Final Standards - Old
Trucks].
34. 42 U.S.C. § 4910 (1976).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 4910(a) (1976).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 4910(c)-(d) (1976).
37. The Secretary of Transportation has the responsibility for enforcing motor
carrier and railroad regulations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4916(b), 4917(b) (1976).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 4903 (1976).
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tion). The Act provides several methods for EPA and the federal
government to jointly reduce levels of noise."
B. Legislative Process
The legislative history of the Noise Control Act is somewhat
sparse. Different versions were passed by each house 0 at the end
of a congressional session;' consequently there was no time for the
bill to go to a House-Senate conference and be reported before
adjournment. Instead, the House amended the Senate bill in a
manner acceptable to the Senate, leaving the legislative history
devoid of a conference report.
Congress was aware of the difficulty of drafting a standard
which was consistent with the Act's goals, yet capable of adminis-
tration by EPA. Senator Tunney, author and floor manager of the
bill, admitted that:
The difficulty of relating noise emissions from a given source to
effects on public health and welfare in an enforceable way led the
[Senate Public Works] committee to conclude that implementa-
tion of a technologically based standard was preferable in terms of
uniformity and enforceability to one calling for protection of the
public health and welfare. While the intention of the whole bill is
to protect public health and welfare from environmental noise, the
39. First, any time a federal agency proposes to prescribe a standard or regula-
tion respecting noise, Section 4 of the NCA, 42 U.S.C. § 4903(c) (1976), requires
that EPA be consulted. EPA may require the proposing agency to explain why a
more restrictive standard should not be adopted but has no additional power.
Comments on federal actions may also be made during review of environmental
impact statements prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1976), and during the procedures under the Clean
Air Act for review and comment on legislation, regulations, and construction
projects of other federal departments and agencies. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7609 (West Supp.
1977) (transferred from 42 U.S.C. § 1857(h)(7) (1970) by Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91
Stat. 685 (1977)). In addition to requiring federal facilities to comply with federal,
state and local noise standards, 42 U.S.C. § 4903(b)(2) (1976), EPA may also
certify products as "low noise emission products" which would allow federal
agencies to spend 25% above the retail price to purchase such goods. 42 U.S.C.
§ 4914 (1976).
40. The Noise Control Act of 1972, H.R. 11021, passed the House on February
19, 1972. 118 CONG. REC. H1508-39 (1972). The Environmental Noise Control Act
of 1972, S. 3342, passed the Senate on October 13, 1972. 118 CONG. REc. S17988-
18014 (1972).
41. The House concurred in the Senate amendment and the Senate concurred
in the House amendment on October 18, 1972, 118 CONG. REc. H10261-62, H10287-
300; S18638-46 (1972). The Second Session of the 92d Congress ended on January
2, 1973.
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committee expects that the application of best available technology
will just begin to realize that goal in the foreseeable future.2
Thus, although the Senate had opted for a cost/technology rather
than health/welfare standard, under the final version, as amended
by the House, the two standards were combined. 3 Senator Tunney
offered his view of the final version:
Under the House amendment, the application of the best available
technology remains the minimum standard, by providing for the
establishment of standards based on both public health and welfare
and the technology available for noise reduction. The Administrator
will have an opportunity to assure that the best which can be done
is done, while at the same time pushing the limits of technology to
achieve greater noise emission control results protective of public
health and welfare."
This explanation indicates that even a sponsor of the bill had
a difficult time understanding the relationship between the
cost/technology and health/welfare standards. Congress avoided
the crucial decision of which standard to apply, deferring instead
to the administrative agency. It was left unclear whether existing
technology is to serve as a limiting factor or whether product regu-
lations are to force technological advance. It is also unclear
whether or not the standard is to be viewed as basically requiring
levels protective of health and welfare except where technology
and cost are overwhelming obstacles.
The following section of this Comment will examine how EPA
has handled this ambiguous and indecisive set of directions, using
as an example regulations establishing noise limits for new and
existing trucks, major contributors to environmental noise. The
process used to select specific noise levels will first be considered.
Then, EPA's behavior will be examined in light of the Act's
health/welfare and cost/technology standards to determine
whether the statutory approach for setting levels was followed or
could have been followed.
42. 118 CoNG. REC. S35387 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Tunney). "Environmental
noise" is defined by the NCA as "the intensity, duration and the character of
sounds from all sources." 42 U.S.C. § 4902(11) (1976).
43. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4905(c)(1) (1976).
44. 118 CONG. REC. S37319 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Tunney).
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II. TRUCKS
The best method of evaluating statutory language that is the
basis of a regulatory scheme is to examine how well it has been
understood by the implementing administrative agency and then
determine whether the desired results have been achieved. The
regulation of trucks has been chosen as a case study because, aside
from airplanes, trucks have an impact on the largest number of
people. 5 Congress itself devoted special attention to trucks. Sec-
tion 6 of the Act identifies transportation equipment as a prelimi-
nary focus in regulating new products," and section 18 specifically
isolates motor carriers currently in operation for regulatory ac-
tion." The following sections will consider whether EPA has been
able to meaningfully interpret and apply the ambiguous standards
provided by the Noise Control Act.
To date, EPA has chosen to regulate only those trucks in use
which weigh over 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight rating
(GVWR) because they are most likely to have the highest noise
levels and contribute proportionately more to the noise problem
because of their generally high annual mileage."
The Act provides different standards for new and old trucks.
Sound levels for old trucks are to "reflect the degree of noise reduc-
tion achievable through the application of the best available tech-
nology, taking into account the cost of compliance"" and may be
issued only after consultation with the Secretary of Transporta-
45. Truck noise is not caused by a single component or function but is com-
prised of five major sources: first is engine noise, a problem caused by internal
combustion and resulting mechanical vibration; second is cooling fan noise, a prob-
lem typically found in high-horsepower engines which results from air flow irregu-
latities; third is engine exhaust noise, the most commonly recognized noise source,
which is partially radiated combustion noise and partially exhaust outlet pressure
variation; fourth is air intake noise which varies greatly with the type of truck:
diesel trucks, for example, are special culprits in noise pollution largely because of
their need for air induction (though their use also corresponds with the increasing
size of the truck): fifth is tire noise, which varies with the type of tire used and can
become the predominant source of noise at speeds over 35 mph. Proposed EPA
Noise Emission Standards for Motor Carriers Engaged in Interstate Commerce, 38
Fed. Reg. 20102, 20103 (1973) (introductory notice by Robert Fri, Acting Adminis-
trator) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Standards - Old Trucks].
46. 42 U.S.C. § 4905(a)(1)(C)(ii) (1976).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 4917(a)(1) (1976).
48. EPA, Background Document for Interstate Motor Carrier Noise Emission
Regulations 1, 4 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Background Document - Old Trucks].
49. 42 U.S.C. § 4917(a)(1) (1976).
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tion. This is a purely technology-based standard in contrast to the
previously noted standard for new products,5" which requires con-
sideration of public health and welfare.
Under the standards for both old and new trucks, EPA has
chosen to establish regulations for the truck as a whole, leaving to
the operator the choice of controls, rather than setting maximum
levels for each sound-producing component. This is sensible for
new trucks where the standard requires that EPA consider public
health and welfare and thus overall noise levels. The standard for
old trucks, however, does not permit consideration of this factor
but, rather, requires the application of best available technology,
which should mean that each component is controlled to the great-
est extent possible.
A. Standard Setting
1. Old trucks
The absence of a health-related standard for old trucks' is
proper because, in general, the retrofitting of products in use is
much more costly than the introduction of new technology at the
design stage of a product.2 Therefore, considerations of both cost
and technology should insure that any improvement in noise re-
duction does not require an expenditure which is excessive.
Administratively, the best way to implement such a provision
would be to develop a series of cost estimates based on a range of
noise levels, considering information on the availability of technol-
ogy and the cost required to retrofit the trucks. The appropriate
standard would be the point just before the chosen control technol-
ogy could be considered unavailable or before the cost became too
50. 42 U.S.C. § 4905 (c)(1) (1976).
51. The permissible sound levels for all motor carriers, including old trucks,
are
Speed Sound Level (at 50 feet)
less than or equal to 35 mph 86 dBA
greater than 35 mph 90 dBA
stationary (full throttle) 88 dBA
40 C.F.R. 202.20, 202.21 (1977).
52. For comparable considerations under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976), see CPC Intern, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329,
1341 (8th Cir. 1976).
1979]
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
much for industry to pass on and remain in business. 3 While it is
possible that EPA took this approach, none of the regulations or
background documents suggests it.
Instead, it appears that EPA worked backwards, by first pick-
ing a standard and then developing cost and technology data to
buttress its choice. The criterion for choosing a standard appears
to have been the minimization of disruption of the trucking indus-
try rather than cost, technology, health, or welfare considerations.
One indication that the industry has been pleased with the regula-
tions is that no suits have been brought challenging the noise levels
set.
When these regulations were first proposed in July, 1973, EPA
noted that several statistical studies of highway noise were used in
their development.' This was a valid first step in determining the
number of vehicles that would require retrofitting and, from that
estimate, the cost to the industry of compliance. The regulation of
motor carriers is comparable to effluent limitations established
under section 301 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972" which the Supreme Court has interpreted
as requiring uniform standards." To consider cost factors for indi-
vidual operators would place an "impossible burden" on EPA.57
There is no indication, however, that EPA used the statistical
studies to consider various cost factors for the industry. Indeed, the
number of trucks which would have been in violation of the chosen
standard was extremely small. EPA anticipated a violation rate of
23%11 if no alterations were made on then-operating trucks. But
since the noisiest trucks are those which log the most miles, only
7% of the number of trucks operating" would actually have to be
retrofitted.
53. The NCA does not contain any provisions requiring that quantifiable cost
be roughly equal to benefit.
54. Proposed Standards - Old Trucks, supra note 45, at 20103-04.
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. V 1975) (amended 1977).
56. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
57. Id. at 132.
58. Background Document - Old Trucks, supra note 48, at 51.
59. Id. EPA also seeks to buttress the 90-dBA level by pointing to a study
which indicates it would, on a typical highway, cause a 3.6-dBA decrease in Ldn
which they said would be a 50% reduction in sound energy. As discussed in note 1,
this represents a significantly less perceptible difference.
Ldn is a measure of sound adopted by EPA related to the decibel. Instead of
looking at intensity at a given moment, it measures the exposure an individual
receives over a given period of time. The general measure is Leq (24) (level equiva-
[Vol. 9:311
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In choosing a 90-dBA level for all trucks over 10,000 pounds,
EPA made only passing mention of the fact that only 2% of two-
axle trucks will violate the standard," without noting that 71.7%
of all trucks are two-axle."' EPA felt that these trucks, if classified
separately, could meet an 88-dBA standard but rejected that ap-
proach because it would not result in a significant reduction in
overall truck noise."2 This is a sensible approach for a regulatory
scheme designed to attain given ambient levels of noise. Unfortun-
ately, the Act did not adopt that method. Therefore, levels for two-
axle trucks do not represent best available technology. The choice
of a 10,000 pound lower limit is probably justified by the fact that
most states had chosen it as a dividing line, 3 and the intent of the
Act is to encourage cooperation in federal and state efforts." Since
almost half of all motor vehicle noise comes from trucks over this
limit," EPA properly focused on them first.
EPA next adopted an 86-dBA limit on trucks traveling below
35 mph. It is possible that this limit was chosen first, and 4-dBA
added to establish the level for all trucks to account for the contri-
bution of tires and other noises related to high speeds. If so, this
would only serve to further impeach the 90-dBA level because the
background document for the regulations implied that an 86-dBA
level could be met by a mandated change in the type of tires used
at speeds over 35 mph.
lent) which is the constant sound level (in dBA) that a given emission and time
period would convey as referenced to the same emission for a 24-hour period. In
living situations Ldn (day-night level) is used. It is the same as Leq except a 10-
dBA penalty is added to sound which occurs between the hours of 10:00 P.M. and
7:00 A.M. See A. Taylor & D. Lipscomb, The Use and Measurement of Equivalent
Sound Level, in NOISE CONTROL HANDBOOK OF PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 61 (A.
Taylor & D. Lipscomb eds. 1978).
60. Final Standards - Old Trucks, supra note 33, at 38209.
61. Background Document - Old Trucks, supra note 48, at 51. EPA did, how-
ever, note this fact in a later document. See, e.g., Final Standards - Old Trucks,
supra note 33, at 38209.
62. Final Standards - Old Trucks, supra note 33, at 38209. It also appeared
that diesel trucks are typically 5-dBA noisier than gasoline-powered trucks though
the regulations make no effort to distinguish them. Proposed Standards - Old
Trucks, supra note 45, at 20103.
63. Final Standards - Old Trucks, supra note 33, at 38210.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 4905 (1976).
65. Background Document - Old Trucks, supra note 48, at 4.
66. Id. at 25. A stationary test has also been devised so that the Department
of Transportation could enforce the regulation at their weighing stations. It corre-
lates well with mobile enforcement levels. Id. at 59.
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The proposed regulations also suggested a standard for level
streets (the other standards assuming the truck to be negotiating
an incline) which would produce lower levels in cities where large
numbers of people might be affected. 7 This was based on the as-
sumption that the standard could be met merely by adjusting
driving habits. When this was questioned, the standard was
dropped," although it is arguable that exposure on city streets
merits special attention, assuming sufficient technology is avail-
able.
After picking a standard, EPA proceeded to apply the cost and
technology requirements of the Act.
2. New trucks
Not surprisingly, trucks have been identified under section 6
as a new product which is a major source of noise."' The Act man-
dates that final regulations for such products be published within
eighteen months7 ' after identification as such, using the criteria for
noise levels noted earlier."
It would not be unreasonable to give owners of trucks one year
to purchase new mufflers and possibly a small amount of addi-
tional noise suppression equipment. It would be unreasonable,
however, to have truck manufacturers re-tool their assembly lines
and convert existing technology into a form that can be applied in
the production of 300,000 new trucks each year. EPA has therefore
imposed a series of noise reduction levels of increasing stringency
over several years (just as auto manufacturers have had to reduce
emissions and increase gasoline mileage over a certain number of
years)." The series is three-tiered. The first tier is an 83-dBA level
imposed largely because several states, including California,
Maryland and Oregon,73 had already adopted it, with the result
67. Proposed Standards - Old Trucks, supra note 45, at 20104.
68. Final Standards - Old Trucks, supra note 33, at 38213.
69. The procedure was required by Section 5(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4904(b)(1)
(1976).
70. They were issued approximately eighteen months late, partially due to
extended hearings.
71. See Part II of this Comment.
72. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7547 (West Supp. 1977).
73. CAL. VEH. CODE § 23130. (West 1971); Maryland Environmental Noise Act
of 1974, MD. ANN. CODE, Art. 43 §§ 822-832 (Michie Supp. 1978); Oregon Environ-
mental Quality Commission Regulations 340-35-030 (1974), pursuant to Oregon
Noise Control Law, OR. REv. STAT. § 467.030(a) (1977).
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that a number of trucks currently in use are already in compliance.
Hence, the technology is both available and proven. The second
. tier is an 80-dBA level, which will not require major advances in
technology. The final tier is a 75-dBA level which will require
extensive modifications and will reduce new truck noise levels to
those of automobiles on the road today, representing a noise reduc-
tion of nearly 50%.1
In reaching these particular levels, EPA had to determine the
limits of the best available technology, which is defined in the Act
as "that noise abatement technology available which produces the
greatest meaningful reduction in the noise produced by medium
and heavy trucks."75 "Available technology" is further defined as
1. technology applications that have been demonstrated to be fea-
sible, as a prototype product upon which production manufacturing
may be based.
2. technology for which there will be a production capacity to pro-
duce the estimated number of parts required in reasonable time to
allow for production, installation on, or manufacture of new prod-
ucts prior to the effective date of the regulation.
3. technology that is compatible with all safety regulations and
takes into account operational considerations, including mainte-
nance and other pollution control equipment."
It is difficult to see why the concern expressed in paragraph three
(i.e., the concern for potential conflict with other safety and pollu-
tion factors) applies to "availability" rather than "quality" of
technology.
The definition of "available technology" is much more con-
servative than the language of the Act suggests. The 1983 standard
for effluent limitations under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act requires use of "best available technology economically
achievable."" Courts have held that technology may be
"available" even if it has "not been applied as long as the record
demonstrates that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the
technology will be available" by the effective date of the regula-
tions.7" This interpretation of the word "available," together with
74. Background Document - Old Trucks, supra note 48, at 4.
75. Proposed EPA Noise Emission Standards for Medium and Heavy Duty
Trucks, 39 Fed. Reg. 38338 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Standards - New
Trucks].
76. Id.
77. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1977).
78. Tanner's Council v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188, 1195 (4th Cir. 1976); see also
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the legislative history," support the conclusion that EPA should
engage in technology forcing to achieve lower noise levels from new
products.
There has even been some retreat from EPA's own definition
of technology demonstrated to be feasible. A prototype truck was
built for the Department of Transportation which could meet a
level of 72-dBA, but it adopted a cooling system which could not
be used on all trucks."' When challenged during rulemaking pro-
ceedings on the failure to have a broadly applicable prototype for
its proposed regulations, EPA re-defined its standard by saying
that any analysis demonstrating that a given technology is feasible
is a sufficient basis for regulations based on that technology.8 ' Ac-
cordingly, EPA felt that at least 75-dBA could be met using best
available technology,"2 though it did not address the possibility
that 72-dBA might also be achievable in a certain number of years.
Any single criterion may act as a weak link in the regulatory
chain and serve to limit the stringency of any regulation. One such
link is the lead time required by a manufacturer to implement
technology. An 83-dBA truck could be produced with two years'
lead time, but a 75-dBA truck takes up to eight years of planning,
research and tooling.83 The target years initially proposed for the
three tiers were 1977, 1981, and 1983,11 but the first two were de-
layed by a year and the 75-dBA limit was dropped altogether. 5
EPA claimed that the 75-dBA level was not dropped for lack of
available technology but because it might impose "unreasonable"
costs, although EPA has never repudiated its own cost estimates
which it deemed "reasonable."" Furthermore, no test of reasona-
bleness has been suggested.
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975), modified, 560
F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978); E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1031 (4th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
79. See text accompanying note 44.
80. Proposed Standards - New Trucks, supra note 75, at 38340.
81. EPA Noise Emission Standards for Medium and Heavy Duty Trucks, 40
C.F.R. §§ 205.50-59 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Final Standards - New Trucks].
82. Proposed Standards - New Trucks, supra note 75, at 38341.
83. EPA, Background Document for Proposed Medium and Heavy Duty Truck
Noise Regulations, 8-22 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Background Document - New
Trucks].
84. Proposed Standards - New Trucks, supra note 75, at 38343.
85. Final Standards - New Trucks, supra note 81, at 15543. The delay was
apparently caused by a lengthening of the period for public comment.
86. Final Standards - New Trucks, supra note 81, at 15541.
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With the advent of new truck regulations, EPA has suddenly
"developed" concern for the urban noise problem, maintaining
that the regulations have been set to meet this problem. The real
reason for this new concern, however, appears to be a reluctance
to set noise levels for truck tires. Thus, at speeds over 35 mph, at
which tire noise predominates, new trucks will be no quieter than
old ones. The result is that highway noise will show very little
decrease; consequently EPA must now look to the urban dweller
if its regulations are to have any raison d'etre. EPA does indicate
that it is gathering data on tires so that possibly in the future it
might act." The bottom line, however, is that until then the im-
pact of these regulations will be greatly reduced.
B. Cost and Technology Factors
1. Old trucks
Standards established pursuant to section 18 for old trucks are
to be based on best available technology considering cost of com-
pliance. EPA's definition of "best available technology," as ap-
plied to old trucks, is "noise abatement technology available for
retrofit application to motor carriers which produces meaningful
reduction in the noise produced by interstate motor carriers.""8
This definition differs from the definition EPA used with regard
to new trucks. 9 "Best available technology" for new trucks re-
quires the "greatest meaningful reduction" of noise as opposed to
merely "meaningful reduction," and is more consistent with Con-
gress' desire for the use of best available technology. "Available"
is separately defined by EPA to include technology for which there
is ample production capacity and which has been demonstrated to
be amenable to retrofitting on existing trucks, implying that tech-
nology cannot be forced. Furthermore, it must be compatible with
other safety regulations. 0
"Cost of compliance" is defined as "the cost of identifying
what action must be taken to meet the specified noise emission
level, and the additional cost of operation and maintenance. The
cost for future replacement parts was also considered.""
87. Proposed Standards - New Trucks, supra note 75, at 38340.
88. Proposed Standards - Old Trucks, supra note 45, at 20103.
89. See text accompanying notes 52-68 supra.
90. Proposed Standards - Old Trucks, supra note 45, at 20103.
91. Id.
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In proposing motor carrier noise regulations, EPA solicited
data on new or existing demonstrable technology and reported
noise abatement technology applicable to diesel engines, fans, air
induction systems and mufflers." To meet the established stan-
dards, EPA concedes most trucks would need only a change in the
type of muffler used. However, because noise at higher speeds may
be primarily due to the type of tire used, a change in tire type
might also be required. 3
Assuming that these are the only required changes and that
the requisite technology exists to meet and even surpass the pro-
posed regulations, it seems clear then that considerations of cost
should determine the appropriate standard. On its face, the cost
of compliance should equal the difference between expenses before
compliance and expenses after compliance. When applied to a
muffler, the appropriate factor EPA should consider, therefore, is
not the cost of the muffler, which a truck would already have, but
instead only the additional cost required to buy a quieter muffler.
Unfortunately, this basic arithmetic eluded EPA. Throughout the
background document for the regulations, the full cost of a muffler
is used. Only casually, and once, is it admitted that "the cost
incurred will be the difference between that for the required muf-
fler and that for the one that would have been installed anyway,
and the difference is within the range of a few dollars."' 4 Yet
throughout EPA's considerations, the "cost" is estimated at be-
tween $35 and $100. This estimate is further unjustified because
mufflers are usually replaced at one-and-one-half year intervals, 5
thus leaving ample time for industrial muffler shopping prior to
the effective date of the regulations." The muffler industry also
assured EPA that it was capable of expanding production to meet
increased demand 7 and more stringent standards.
92. Background Document - Old Trucks, supra note 48, at 14-17.
93. Proposed Standards - Old Trucks, supra note 45, at 20104. There would
be a small percentage of trucks which would need additional retrofitting. Final
Standards - Old Trucks, supra note 33, at 38211.
94. Background Document - Old Trucks, supra note 48, at 66; see also Hear-
ings; supra note 33, at 54-55.
95. Id.
96. The final standards were promulgated on October 21, 1974, but the regula-
tions did not go into effect until October 15, 1975. Final Standards - Old Trucks,
supra note 33; 40 C.F.R. § 200.11 (1977).
EPA also has authority under section 8 of the NCA to require labeling of
mufflers as to their noise reduction characteristics. 42 U.S.C. § 4907 (1976).
97. Proposed Standards - Old Trucks, supra note 45, at 20104; Final Standards
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The same situation exists regarding the required change in
types of tires which normally must also be replaced within a period
of about one year.' Furthermore, changing tire types may not even
involve a cost differential but only a need to shift buying habits."
This consideration was not emphasized by EPA in determining
cost of compliance partly because it claimed some ignorance of
possible costs, though without explaining why."'0 In fact, the regu-
lations merely presume the use of noncomplying tires which pre-
sumption may be rebutted at the testing station by showing that
the truck nevertheless meets the standards for speeds over 35
mph.'O
Accepting arguendo EPA's cost figures for the purpose of ex-
amining their supposed burden on the trucking industry, it is diffi-
cult to discern the test being applied. It is estimated that the
regulatory authority extends to one million of the five million
trucks engaged in interstate commerce."' Based on this estimate,
an assumed average compliance cost of $135 (the cost of a new
muffler) and the additional fact that only 7% of all trucks would
require retrofit to meet the 90-dBA standard, a net cost of $9.5
million would result."3 Not only is this cost deemed acceptable,
but EPA suggests that even the $150 million industry estimate
would not be an unreasonable burden. Considering that the $9.5
million figure itself is inflated, it seems apparent that more strin-
gent standards could have been imposed without producing an
unreasonable cost.
A somewhat closer case might be presented, again assuming
inflated cost figures, by the impact on the individual operator
whose cost of compliance is estimated to be $0.003 per mile with
an average revenue of $1.24 and an average cost of $1.20."' If this
is not considered an undue profit reduction, the actual cost of
-Old Trucks, supra note 33, at 38211. In addition, a truck manufacturer indicated
its intention to work with parts suppliers to develop a noise control package to meet
the standards. Id.
98. Background Document -. Old Trucks, supra note 48, at 66.
99. Proposed Standards - Old Trucks, supra note 45, at 20104. There is some
suggestion, though, that it might be $0.23 per thousand miles. Background Docu-
ment - Old Trucks, supra note 48, at 26.
100. Background Document -Old Trucks, supra note 48, at 25.
101. 40 C.F.R. § 202.23 (1977).
102. Final Standards - Old Trucks, supra note 33, at 38210.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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compliance would seemingly not be unreasonable if applied to a
larger number of trucks."5 Unfortunately, nowhere are we told the
cost of alternative levels and at what point those costs might be
considered an undue burden. Some suggestion is made that lower
levels might be attainable, but nowhere is the basis for the judg-
ment given.106
2. New trucks
EPA has defined the cost of compliance for new trucks as
the cost of identifying what action must be taken to meet the speci-
fied noise emission level, the cost of taking that action, potential
decrease in sales as a result of higher product cost, as well as any
additional cost of operation and maintenance. The cost for future
replacement parts and possible decrease in useful life of vehicle was
also considered.'0
EPA has apparently rejected any suggestion that this definition
requires a cost/benefit analysis and instead prefers to emphasize
the small percentage increase in cost.' Such an interpretation is
consistent with the Act which does not suggest that costs must be
comparable to the benefits received.
The cost implication of this standard is very strange - it will
save truck owners money. Under traditional economic theory, if a
certain action is more efficient or economical than another, it
should be taken without the need for government regulation. '" For
example, one problem truck manufacturers will have to face in
meeting the new levels is reducing the noise from truck fans. Ap-
parently the best solution is to install a fan clutch, a cut-off device
which only activates the fan when actually needed (about one
percent of the time). In terms of annual operating costs, the device
would save approximately $460 million each year in gasoline and
engine wear. 10 This saving alone - not the regulation - should
therefore be sufficient inducement for the installation of the de-
vice. However, this has not been the case. The 1973 fuel shortage
caused little increase in the use of fan clutches, so it is fair to credit
the regulation with providing the impetus for their use."'
105. Background Document - Old Trucks, supra note 48, at 65.
106. Proposed Standards - Old Trucks, supra note 45, at 20104.
107. Proposed Standards - New Trucks, supra note 75, at 38338.
108. Final Standards - New Trucks, supra note 81, at 15542.
109. R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 4, 279 (1977).
110. Background Document - New Trucks, supra note 83, at 7-9.
111. Id.
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Using worst case estimates (assuming zero cost savings from
the mass implementation of technology and also assuming no tech-
nological improvements) the greatest cost increases for new heavy-
duty diesel trucks will be 0.8% for compliance with an 83-dBA
level, 1.9% for an 80-dBA level, and 4.5% for a 75-dBA level." 2 It
is not clear whether these cost estimates reflect the same metho-
dological error as did the estimates for old trucks (i.e., total cost
as opposed to added cost of complying with the regulation). In any
event, EPA is convinced, except for the 75-dBA level, that since
trucking is a stable industry, there should be only a small decline
in truck sales and the increase in capital and operating expenses,
even when savings from fan clutches are ignored, are reasonable
and not a basis for rejecting the new regulations."'
These worst case estimates may be expressed in another way.
The projected cost of the regulations for the years 1978 through
1991 is $225 million."' This represents 0.25% of the $89.1 billion
annual revenue of the trucking industry."' The use of a percentage
of annual revenue in determining the cost impact on an industry
has previously been employed in reviewing effluent limitations es-
tablished under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act."' Al-
though not an abbreviated cost/benefit analysis, it does enable
EPA to determine whether an industry can successfully absorb the
cost of compliance and remain in business. Since cost is only to be
a secondary consideration in setting standards, this is an appropri-
ate degree of inquiry.
112. Proposed Standards - New Trucks, supra note 75, at 38342. Industry
estimates are higher for 75 dBA by a factor of four. General Motors Corporation,
Comments of General Motors Corporation with Respect to Transportation Equip-
ment Noise Emission Controls, VII-13, December 20, 1974. In its final regulations,
EPA revised the percentage increase for 80 dBA to 2.8% and, based on comments
received during the notice and comment period, dropped its estimate for 75 dBA
due to a need for further study. Final Standards - New Trucks, supra note 81, at
15542.
113. Proposed Standards - New Trucks, supra note 75, at 38342; Background
Document - New Trucks, supra note 83, at 7-22, 7-27, 7-41.
114. Pollution Control Guide Newsletter (CCH), April 19, 1976, at 197.
115. Id.
116. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d at 1052-53. A minor cost
that will be imposed involves having manufacturers perform testing on trucks to
insure compliance. This should entail an initial expenditure of only $50,000 for a
test facility and an estimated cost per truck of only $0.60. Proposed Standards -
New Trucks, supra note 75, at 38346; Final Standards - New Trucks, supra note
81, at 15542.
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The regulations also impose a labelling requirement"' and re-
quire that each truck be warranted. This will help insure that the
truck meets the required levels throughout its useful life, although
at the moment EPA feels it does not have sufficient information
to set a useful life requirement,"' thus leaving a gap in the whole
scheme. Unless care is taken to insure that trucks maintain their
noise characteristics, assuming proper maintenance, these regula-
tions will be of little value. EPA hopes to gather enough data to
impose such a requirement.
C. Health and Welfare Factors
Under Section 18, EPA is not to consider, nor has it consid-
ered, health and welfare in setting sound levels for old trucks."'
Such factors are only to be considered in promulgating new truck
regulations.
The addition of public health and welfare to the criteria for
regulation ought to have some effect on the resulting noise emis-
sion levels for new trucks. Yet EPA candidly admits that "these
noise levels are not sufficiently protective of public health and
welfare,"' 2 without indicating that cost or technology were prohib-
itive. There is no indication that these factors played any part in
setting the levels. In the background document accompanying the
final regulations, EPA devoted a great deal of space to studying the
impact the regulations would have on the number of people ex-
posed to noise levels in excess of the 55 Ldn' 2 ' considered protective
of public health and welfare.'2 It also examined the degree of inter-
ference various levels would have at given distances in different
situations on activities such as conversation, thought and sleep.'2
Despite all this, when the final regulations were issued, the level
ultimately most protective of health and welfare, 75-dBA, was
dropped, at least temporarily.1u
117. Proposed Standards - New Trucks, supra note 75, at 38345.
118. Final Standards - New Trucks, supra note 81, at 15543.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 4917 (1976).
120. Final Standards - New Trucks, supra note 81, at 15538.
121. For a definition of Ldn, see note 59, supra.
122. Environmental Protection Agency, Information on Levels Of Environ-
mental Noise Requisite to Protect Public Health and Welfare With An Adequate
Margin Of Safety (1974).
123. Background Document - New Trucks, supra note 83, at 6-19.
124. Final Standards - New Trucks, supra note 81, at 15541.
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D. Enforcement
Congress, in choosing to devote special attention to the prob-
lem of noise from trucks, could be said to be stating its disenchant-
ment with things as they were. If so, it would be reasonable to
expect that in enforcing the standards set under the Act, a fairly
high violation rate might initially appear. Despite this expecta-
tion, the figures tell a different story.
EPA's regulations for old and new trucks became effective
October 15, 1975.125 It is the responsibility of the Secretary of
Transportation to implement and enforce these regulations
through his enforcement authority and the enforcement provisions
of the Act. Pursuant to that authority, the Department of Trans-
portation, Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, issued compliance reg-
ulations which were essentially testing procedures, "7 effective the
same day as EPA's regulations. An employee of the Chicago office
of the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety reported few violations and,
based on experience, opined that most trucks on the road, includ-
ing diesel trucks, could meet an 83-dBA level where a 90-dBA level
is in effect, recognizing that some older trucks might not be able
to comply.'28 The City of Chicago adopted the federal standards
but after a brief attempt at enforcement at speeds exceeding 35
mph found too low a rate of violation to warrant the effort.'29 The
Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety in Washington, D.C. has compiled
a more extensive record covering enforcement for the period be-
tween the effective date of the regulation and December 1, 1976,
or a little over one year.'" Of 13,964 trucks measured, only 3.12%
were in violation of the 90-dBA standards.'3 ' Violation rates at
other levels were:
level in dBA percent above level
88 6.68
86 18.98
83 57.89
125. 40 C.F.R. § 202.11 (1977).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 4917(b) (1976).
127. 49 C.F.R. § 325 (1977).
128. Phone conversation with Mr. Dennis Martini, Federal Highway Adminis-
tration, Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, Chicago, Illinois, January 31, 1977.
129. Phone conversation with Mr. Poston, Department of Environmental Con-
trol, City of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, January 31, 1977.
130. Unpublished report of the Federal Highway Administration.
131. Id.
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It is clear from these figures that the noise pollution caused by
trucks has been relatively unaffected by passage of section 18. The
penalty provision of the Act further detracts, although indirectly,
from its effectiveness. The provision, which parallels certain pen-
alty provisions of the Clean Air Act,' calls for fines of up to
$25,000 per day of violation or imprisonment of up to one year, or
both. 3 The magnitude of these penalties has dissuaded the Fed-
eral Highway Administration from seeking their imposition for fear
of being thrown out of court by a judge who finds violent crime
more troublesome than a noisy muffler."'
As noted earlier, the Act contains a comparable section for
railroads' under which regulations have been issued setting maxi-
mum noise emission levels for locomotives and rail cars. 6 A com-
parison of American and Japanese motor carrier and railroad stan-
dards demonstrates for many of the reasons stated above that
American standards are extremely lax.'37 The American truck
standard allows a 96-dBA level at twenty-five feet. Compared with
the Japanese level of 89-dBA, the American level permits the oper-
ation of trucks one-and-one-half times as loud. 38 Similarly, the
railroad standards which EPA has promulgated will allow four
times the noise intensity of the most protective Japanese standard
as well as allowing exemptions which will delay attainment of even
that level.'39
Unfortunately, the noise control of existing trucks and rail-
roads has been purely cosmetic with no real benefit to the public.
It has not been without expense, however, which absent any real
improvement is a waste. No regulation at all would be preferable
to the existing scheme.
132. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c) (West Supp. 1977).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 4910(a) (1976).
134. Phone conversation with Mr. Arthur McAndrew, Chief, Compliance Divi-
sion, Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, Federal Highway Administration, Washing-
ton, D.C., February 1, 1977.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 4916 (1976).
136. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Noise Control Program: Progress
to Date 13 (1976).
137. Cooke, Noise Regulation: Recent Japanese and American Standards Dif-
fer Significantly, A. Railroads, I HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 553 (1976); and Bennet, Id.,
B. Highway Motor Noise, at 558.
138. Bennett, supra note 137, at 559-60.
139. Cooke, supra note 137, at 556-57.
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E. Conclusions
The truck experience has provided the opportunity to evaluate
the use of both a cost/technology and a health/welfare standard for
old and new trucks respectively. Both have been failures. Less
stringent regulations than called for by the Noise Control Act were
issued, thus delaying attainment of the legislative goal of "an envi-
ronment for all Americans free from noise that jeopardizes their
health and welfare." 10 The failures, motivated by different factors,
suggest the appropriateness of a legislative remedy and the form
it should take.
The failure of EPA in implementing the health/welfare stan-
dard is not surprising. The congressional directive was so obscure
that even if it were the proper type of standard, application would
have been extremely difficult. EPA made an effort to consider the
impact reductions would have on the number of people exposed to
excessive sound but, understandably, found no way of relating that
to a product standard. Thus, EPA was using, without so admit-
ting, a cost/technology approach despite the arguable intent of
the Act that these be only secondary factors with primary focus
placed on health/welfare concerns.
EPA failed in applying a cost/technology standard as well.
The reason was not as fundamental as the inapplicability of the
standard to product regulation. Part of the failure was a concep-
tual mistake in the meaning of "cost." Once alerted to this error,
the agency is not likely to err again. The remainder of the failed
effort seems attributable to an unwillingness, though not a lack of
ability, to apply the cost/technology methodology to determine the
proper level of control. In the absence of proof, at least an inference
of industry pressure is raised. There is no reason to doubt that the
standard itself is both appropriate and capable of successful appli-
cation.
The absence of judicial interpretation and enforcement of
these provisions is regrettable and may be explained by the fact
that the regulations have been so favorable to the regulated indus-
try. The following section proposes a legislative remedy that ad-
dresses the dual failures of EPA through a revision of the Act's
standard. The absence of a civil penalty for enforcement is also
discussed.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 4901(b) (1976).
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III. PROPOSED REVISION OF THE NOISE CONTROL ACT
The NCA is a perfect example of congressional avoidance of
major policy decisions through the use of ambiguous language and
the establishment of a regulatory program ill-suited to achieve the
stated'goal-of the legislation. The result is an abdication of policy-
making power to an administrative agency and, oftentimes, ulti-
mately to a judge. The failings of the Act have unavoidably re-
sulted in poor implementation which has not been aided by judi-
cial interpretation. Thus, the burden now rests with Congress in
its role as overseer of federal programs and funds to correct the Act
and clarify the depth of its commitment to noise control.
The NCA has served as a first step in focusing attention on
the problem of noise and demonstrating that it is possible to con-
trol the ever-increasing levels of noise without threatening in-
dustrial and technological growth. However, EPA's experience
with regulating the noise characteristics of trucks has shown that
for the Act to be effective, clearer guidance and a revised standard
are necessary. The following language is suggested:'
§ 6(c)(1). Any regulation prescribed under subsection (a) or (b) of
this section (and any revision thereof) respecting a product shall
include a noise emission standard which shall set limits on noise
emissions from such product and shall be a standard which in the
141. The current provision is:
Any regulation prescribed under subsection (a) or (b) of this section
(and any revision thereof) respecting a product shall include a noise emission
standard which shall set limits on noise emission from such product and shall
be a standard which in the Administrator's judgment, based on criteria
published under section 4904 of this title, is requisite to protect the public
health and welfare, taking into account the magnitude and conditions of use
of such product (alone or in combination with other noise sources), the de-
gree of noise reduction achievable through the application of the best avail-
able technology, and the cost of compliance. In establishing such a standard
for any product, the Administrator shall give appropriate consideration to
standards under other laws designed to safeguard the health and welfare of
persons, including any standards under the National Traffic and Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Act of 1966, the Clean Air Act, and the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act. Any such noise emission standards shall be a performance stan-
dard. In addition, any regulation under subsection (a) or (b) of this section
(and any revision thereof) may contain testing procedures necessary to as-
sure compliance with the emission standard in such regulation, and may
contain provisions respecting instructions of the manufacturer for the main-
tenance, use or repair of the product.
42 U.S.C. § 4905(c)(1) (1976).
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Administrator's judgment, based on criteria published under section
5, reflects the degree of noise reduction achievable through the ap-
plication of the best available technology taking into account the
cost of compliance. In addition, any regulation under subsection (a)
or (b) (and any revision thereof) may contain testing procedures
necessary to insure compliance with the emission standard in such
regulation, and instructions of the manufacturer for the mainte-
nance, use or repair of the product.
§ 6(f). For purposes of this section:
(1) The term "best available technology" means technology
providing the greatest meaningful reduction in noise which exists
and is in use, or has been adequately demonstrated, or which there
is a reasonable basis to believe will be available for use to permit
compliance by the effective date of regulations under this section.
It does not include technology which will substantially impair com-
pliance with other federal safety, health or environmental legisla-
tion.
(2) The term "cost of compliance" means costs solely attribut-
able to compliance with regulations under this section and which
allows an industry to comply and still remain economically viable.
A. Proposed New Standard
The major goal of environmental legislation has been the pro-
tection of public health and the environment from the effects of
pollution. When the federal government assumes responsibility for
achieving this goal, it is proper for Congress to phrase its mandates
in terms of public health and welfare. The Noise Control Act de-
parts from the model of air and water pollution legislation in that
it does not place responsibility on the federal government to limit
environmental noise. This responsibility has been left with the
states. The federal government, instead, has the limited role of
regulating only new products, airplanes, railroads and motor car-
riers. Since it is impossible to devise regulations which take into
account every possible use or combination of uses of products, the
best approach is to regulate individual products at the production
stage, leaving, as the Act has done, product use regulation to the
states. Therefore, this Comment suggests that regulations be based
solely on cost and technology factors. A health and welfare stan-
dard without accompanying control over ambient levels is simply
unworkable, as has been demonstrated by EPA's inability to apply
it to new truck regulation.
A cost/technology approach is especially useful for noise regu-
lation. Unlike many sources of air and water pollution, most noise
sources are mobile, making modeling of combined effects of several
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sources difficult. This problem is compounded by the lack of pers-
istence of noise. The net contribution of various low intensity
sources over time is often less relevant than brief but high intensity
exposure, which is capable of causing harm or disturbance. It is up
to the states through noise ordinances, traffic controls and other
measures to insure against excessive exposure.
A single cost/technology standard is fully applicable to all new
products plus old trucks and rail carriers. As has been stated, cost
and technology are the only realistic factors useful in product regu-
lation. This standard was the one chosen by Congress in sections
17 and 18 of the Act for regulating old trucks and railroads.'
EPA's problem has simply been an incorrect application. In part,
this is the reason for adding the definitions of cost and technology
to the statute. They should provide better guidance to EPA in
implementing the Act. Furthermore, there has been extensive liti-
gation over the meaning of these or similar terms as used in the
Clean Air Act"3 and Federal Water Pollution Control Act.'4 If
Congress codifies the definitions which have been found in these
cases, the amount of litigation, and hence delay, in implementa-
tion will be reduced.
B. Best Available Technology
There are at least four possible technological standards for
environmental legislation.'" The first is to require adoption of
practices currently in use. This, of course, provides no incentives
for improving control technology and may provide an inadequate
level of control. The second is to place the burden of exhausting
technological possibilities on the regulated parties. Such an ap-
'proach lacks efficiency and may not produce uniform results. The
third possibility is to impose prescribed emission levels regardless
of the state of the art of the appropriate technology. This is cer-
tainly a bold approach. It was tried with automobile emissions but
it failed.
The legislated reductions in automobile emissions provide a
demonstration that the courts and Congress will not allow environ-
mental concerns to cause massive economic dislocation. The 1970
142. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4916-4917 (West Supp. 1977).
143. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (West Supp. 1977).
144. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251-1376 (West Supp. 1977).
145. W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 124-25 (1977).
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Clean Air Act provided for suspensions of the standards if certain
conditions were met." ' Shortly after applications were authorized,
most of the automakers applied for a one-year delay. The 'equests
were denied by EPA because some of the conditions were not met.
In International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, however, the D.C.
Circuit interpreted the conditions as independent in order to allow
the suspensions to be given." ' In 1976 the automakers informed
Congress they could not meet 1978 model year emission standards
and if the law were not changed they would be forced to shut down.
While amendments to the Clean Air Act failed in 1976, they were
finally passed before the summer recess in 1977, allowing new car
production to take place."' One commentator's view of
International Harvester, equally true of the Clean Air Act amend-
ments, was that by lessening "the pressure on the manufacturers,
it [the court] invalidated the largest experiment in the possibili-
ties of technology forcing contained in the environmental laws.""'
While the automobile industry might be viewed as an exceptional
case, there has been a general reluctance to shut down whole in-
dustries, as opposed to fringe plants, as a result of enforcement of
environmental laws."' Until the health risk posed by pollutants
can be shown to have greater economic consequences than the
continued operation of the polluter, it is fruitless to continue play-
ing this game of bluffs.
The fourth possibility, adopted in this proposed revision, is a
limited form of technology forcing. It need only be shown that
technology will reasonably appear to be available by the time it is
to be applied in achieving the emissions limitation. It is proper
that industries be given a chance to rebut decisions made by the
Administrator. In reviewing the resulting standards, insofar as
EPA articulates the basis of its decision,"' the appropriate stan-
dard of review then is whether the actions were "arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
146. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
147. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
148. 1977 8 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) 570.
149. Kramer, Economics, Technology, and the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970: The First Six Years. 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 161, 217 (1976).
150. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. settlement with EPA concerning
National Emission Standards for Vinyl Chloride under § 112 of the Clean Air Act,
where the law clearly dictated an industry shutdown. 42 Fed. Reg. 28154 (1977).
151. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
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law."'' 2 Industry thus essentially bears the burden of proof that the
methods used were incorrect or the wrong result was reached in
setting standards based on anticipated technology.'
It is true that a technology-based standard can provide some
disincentive for the development of new technologies,'54 but by
setting levels which can be reasonably obtained in the future by
technological innovation or progress, industry will be obliged to
explain why these advances could not be achieved. To prevent
shutdowns, industry will have an opportunity to make this show-
ing before the effective date of the regulations.'55
This approach of setting standards somewhere beyond the
technological status quo has been adopted by Congress in other
legislation. The Clean Air Act, in setting performance standards
for new sources, an analogous situation to new product regulation
under the Noise Act, takes into account the most efficient ap-
proach of incorporating developing technology at the design stage,
requiring the "application of the best system of emission reduction
which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction)
the Administrator determines has been adequately demon-
strated."'56 "Adequately demonstrated" has even been taken to
mean "what may fairly be projected for the regulated future,
rather than the state of the art at present, since it is addressed to
standards for new plants.""' 7 A standard of "best available technol-
ogy economically achievable" is employed by the 1972 Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (FWPCA) for setting
effluent limitations effective in 1983.lu Industrial polluters would
152. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976); Cf. Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) ("To make this
finding the court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration
of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.").
153. Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts,
122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 535-36 (1974).
154. Note, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972:
Ambiguity As A Control Device, 10 HARV. J. LEGIS. 565, 591-92 (1973).
155. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d at 1062. In discussing the
1983 effluent standards, the court said that the FWPCA "contemplates a period of
a few years after which the accuracy of the Administrator's evaluations and projec-
tions can be reviewed in light of actual experience."
156. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
157. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 391 (D.C. Cir.
1973). See also Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 433-34 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train, 539, F.2d 775, 785 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
158. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1977).
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therefore have six years to meet this after having adopted "best
practicable control technology" by 1977.11' Basically, FWPCA pro-
vides a sufficient lead time for upgrading technology. The Fourth
Circuit has interpreted this standard as allowing EPA to "assess
technologies that have not been applied as long as the record dem-
onstrates that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the tech-
nology will be available by 1983."'11 New source guidelines under
FWPCA are to be based on "best available demonstrated control
technology,"'' which only requires that technology be demon-
strated in pilot projects." 2
Thus, standards which take into account technology not im-
mediately available but based on reasonable projections have been
workable. Where there is sufficient lead time to adapt existing
sources, or where new sources or products are built, it makes sense
that the outer limits of technology be applied. We will have to live
with these sources for a while and they cannot be more than mini-
mally polluting if the goal of a safe environment is to be met.
Reference to other environmental legislation has been dropped
in the proposed new standard and Congress' apparent intent that
regulations under the Act not hinder compliance with other envi-
ronmental legislation has been spelled out.
C. Considering the Cost:of Compliance
The availability of technology will often not be the limiting
factor in the control of noise. As seen with the new truck standards,
the Administrator felt a 75-dBA limit was technologically feasible,
but the decision to drop the limit was attributed to cost factors.
The existing standard offers little guidance on how economic fac-
tors are to be considered.
If all costs and benefits could be quantified, EPA could be
directed to weigh the value of any marginal increase in noise con-
trol with resulting benefits. But as the court in Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus stated in the context of air pollution, "[t]he
difficulty, if not impossibility, of quantifying the benefit to am-
bient air conditions [of emission reductions] further militates
159. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1977).
160. Tanner's Council v. Train, 540 F.2d at 1195; see also E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541'F.2d at 1032.
161. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1316(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
162. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d at 1059.
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against the imposition of such an imperative [cost/benefit analy-
sis] on the agency."'' 3 This is also applicable to noise reductions.
Since noise does pose a risk to human health and, according
to the World Health Organization, costs $4 billion annually in
the United States in accidents, absenteeism, inefficiency and
compensation claims,' a substantial expenditure is justified in
eliminating these effects.
The proposed definition, consistent with the 1983 effluent lim-
itation standards under the FWPCA, focuses primarily on an in-
dustry's ability to absorb the required costs. Thus, in drafting
regulations, EPA will be primarily concerned with the availability
of technology, and cost will only be a limiting factor in the ex-
treme. This approach was emphasized in Senator Muskie's some-
what inconsistent language in discussing economic considerations
in setting the 1983 limits under FWPCA:
While cost should be a factor in the Administrator's judgment, no
balancing test will be required. The Administrator will be bound by
a test of reasonableness. In this case, the reasonableness of what is
"economically achievable" should reflect an evaluation of what
needs to be done to move toward the elimination of the discharge of
pollutants and what is achievable through the application of avail-
able technology - without regard to cost. "5
It is unlikely, however, that Congress or the public is willing
to accept the "Draconian possibility""' of shutting down an indus-
try. Therefore, the appropriate considerations of cost will center on
whether "an industry can afford the technology, has access to mar-
ket powers to pass the costs along, and that technology is not
demonstrably exorbitant.""' This still leaves the possibility that
some marginal firms within an industry will be forced to close,
163. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d at 387. Statutory lan-
guage requiring the Administrator to "consider cost" has been interpreted as not
requiring a cost/benefit analysis. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d at
1059.
164. 118 CONG. REC. H6043 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Mikva).
165. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AcT AMEND-
MENTS OF 1972, Senate Consideration of the Report of the Conference Committee,
October 4, 1972, at 171 (emphasis added). (Comm. Print 1973).
166. Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 245, 273 (1976) (Powell, J. concur-
ring).
167. W. Rodgers, supra note 153, at 466. See also Portland Cement Ass'n v.
Train, 513 F.2d 506, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1975); CPC Intern, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d at
1341-42.
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something Congress has been willing to accept as a consequence
of eradicating pollution.' 8
D. Danger of Unnecessarily Stringent Limits
The major drawback of a cost/technology regulatory standard
is that it may require levels significantly below those required to
protect public health and welfare. Unfortunately, as has been seen,
the standard which produces a solution with a perfect fit to the
problem, a health/welfare standard, is inapplicable.
This problem is mitigated in two ways. First, the Act only
permits regulation of products which are either a major source of
noise within certain categories or alternatively threaten public
health and welfare.'6 This will at least limit the number of prod-
ucts which will be regulated at all. Second, it ought to be within
the Administrator's discretion not to impose costs which bear no
relation to the degree of noise reduction achieved.
E. Enforcement
The following statutory revisions are proposed:
§ 11(a) Whenever the Administrator believes any person is in viola-
tion of section 10(a) of this Act, he may with reasonable promptness
issue a citation to that person. Each citation shall be in writing and
shall describe with particularity the nature of the violation, includ-
ing a reference to the provision of the Act, standard, rule, regulation,
or order alleged to have been violated. The Administrator, in the
citation or by registered mail within a reasonable time after issu-
ance, shall propose a penalty to be assessed under subsection (c).
(b) If any person receiving a citation notifies the Administra-
tor that he intends to contest the citation or any notification issued
under subsection (a) of this section the Administrator shall afford
an opportunity for a hearing (in accordance with section 554 of Title
5, United States Code, but without regard to subsection (a)(3) of
such section). The Administrator shall thereafter issue an order,
based on findings of fact, affirming, modifying, or vacating the cita-
tion or proposed penalty, or directing other appropriate relief, and
such order shall become final thirty days after its issuance.
(c) Any person who has received a citation for violation of
section 10(a) of this Act may be assessed a civil penalty up to
$10,000 for each such violation.
168. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d at 1052.
169. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4905(a)(1)(A) & (b) (1976).
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(d) Civil penalties owed under this Act shall be paid to the
Administrator for deposit into the Treasury of the United States and
shall accrue to the United States and may be recovered in a civil
action in the name of the United States brought in the United States
district court for the district where the violation is alleged to have
occurred or where the person has his principal office or residence.
The hesitance of EPA and the Department of Transportation
to make use of criminal sanctions against violators of the Noise
Control Act provisions creates a pressing need for the addition of
administrative penalties to the Act's enforcement provisions. The
criminal penalties should neither be removed nor lessened, how-
ever, because a punishment "by a fine of not more than $25,000
per day of violation, or by imprisonment of not more than one year,
or both"'170 ought to remain available for widespread violations by
a manufacturer. Penalties less stringent would not be a sufficient
deterrent on such a large scale.
Now that the Supreme Court in Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA'7'
has at least upheld the use of administrative penalties against a
seventh amendment lack of jury trial challenge, 7 ' the penalty pro-
visions might generally be modeled after those in the Occupational
Safety and Health Act.' Based on inspection or other investiga-
tion, citations would be given out for violations, such as for non-
complying trucks.' The violator would then be notified of any
penalty and given the opportunity to request an administrative
hearing.' Penalties would be based on the number of violations
and the degree of knowledge."7 ' OSHA has been interpreted as not
identifying each day as a separate violation.'" This is contrary to
the criminal penalties under the Noise Control Act and so under
any revision each day ought to be considered a separate violation
for purposes of administrative penalties. As with criminal penal-
ties, administrative penalties would be flexible up to a maximum
amount. This should even allow effective on-the-highway enforce-
170. 42 U.S.C. § 4910(a) (1976).
171. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
172. "Congress is not required by the Seventh Amendment to choke the al-
ready crowded federal courts with new types of litigation or prevented from commit-
ting some new types of litigation to administrative agencies with special compe-
tence in the relevant field." 430 U.S. at 455.
173. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
174. 29 U.S.C. § 658 (1976).
175. 29 U.S.C. § 659 (1976).
176. 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1976).
177. Currie, OSHA, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1107, 1148.
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ment of truck standards once they have been revised under the
criteria suggested by this Comment.
F. Conclusions
The problems environmental legislation addresses are so var-
ied that particular solutions are often not interchangeable. What
must be realized is that each statute is only an experiment in
dealing with those problems. Experience under the Noise Control
Act illustrates that Congress' responsibility only begins with pas-
sage of legislation. Standards such as cost/technology and
health/welfare are blunt instruments which need adjustment and
fine tuning if they are to be effective in reducing pollution. Only
through vigorous and continuous oversight can Congress determine
whether a legislative experiment has been successful. When suc-
cess is not forthcoming, as here, Congress has an obligation to try
a different approach, based on the results of past efforts. Admit-
tedly, the most promising approach is often the victim of political
compromise. The history of implementation may be sufficiently
convincing that a firmer position, or perhaps no further action at
all, would be preferable. What is most important is that a reassess-
ment take place and a renewed or revised commitment be made
to legislative goals.
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